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Socratic Metaethics Imagined 
Steve Ross and Lisa Warenski 
 
A time machine mysteriously appeared one day in ancient Athens. Curious about 
the future of philosophical dialogue, Socrates entered the device and traveled to 
the 21st Century. He spent several months in the United Kingdom and United 
States discussing metaethics before returning to Athens, now a devoted and 
formidable quasi-realist moral expressivist.  
Upon his return to Athens, Socrates went down to the Piraeus to see the 
festival for the Thracian goddess Bendis. On his way back toward town, he met 
up with Polemarchus, who entreated him to join him and several others in his 
company for dinner at his home, where Socrates could also visit with 
Polemarchus’s aged father, Cephalus. 
Socrates accepted the invitation. Upon their arrival, the group and some 
guests who were already there sat in a circle beside Cephalus. Socrates and 
Cephalus entered into a conversation about the burdens of old age. The 
conversation turned to the value of having lived a just and pious life, and quite 
naturally, to the question of justice itself. At that point, Socrates challenged the 
guests to say what justice is, and after several failed attempts on the part of 
Polemarchus, Thrasymachus jumped into the conversation.1 
 
Thrasymachus: Listen, then. I say justice is nothing other than what is 
advantageous for the stronger. Well, why do you not praise me?  No, you are 
unwilling. 
Socrates: First, I must understand what you mean. For, as things stand, I do 
not. You say that what is advantageous for the stronger is just. What on earth do 
you mean, Thrasymachus?   
                                                          
1 Remarks in the opening section of the dialogue are based on the 2004 C.D.C Reeve translation 
of the Republic. Views similar to those attributed to Socrates here are found in Blackburn (1993, 
1998 and 2009: §2) and Gibbard (2003). We note that Paul Bloomfield (2003: 524-25) has also 
observed the analogy between some of the views expressed here by Socrates and those of 
Thrasymachus. We are grateful to Nickolas Pappas and the editors of this journal for helpful 
comments, especially on matters pertaining to Ancient Greece and Plato’s Republic. 
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Thrasymachus: Some cities are ruled tyrannically, some democratically, and 
some aristocratically. And each ruling group sets down laws for its own 
advantage. In each city, the ruling group is the stronger one. And each type of 
government makes the laws that are advantageous for itself. In legislating, each 
declares what is just for its subjects. But this is simply what is advantageous for 
itself. Justice is the same thing in all cities, and it this: what is advantageous for 
the established rulers.  
Socrates: Now I see what you mean. But justice cannot be that which is 
advantageous for the stronger. Justice is not a set of facts about what is 
advantageous for some particular group. You are mistaking a normative term for 
a descriptive one. When we judge that a ruler or ruling body is just, we do not 
describe some segment of reality; rather, we express an attitude or plan.   
Thrasymachus: You are so far from understanding justice that you do not 
realize that justice really is the good of another, what is advantageous for the 
stronger and the ruler, and harmful for the one who serves and obeys. So as I 
said from the beginning, the stronger party says what is right. And what is said is 
whatever is in fact in the stronger party's interest. One might put it this way:  
Might makes right. Or:  The one with political power determines what is just in 
each particular case.  
Socrates: Might does not make right, Thrasymachus. You suppose, falsely, 
that there are truthmakers for moral claims. But moral claims are not like that. 
Moral claims do not match or fail to match any facts that would make them true 
or false, right or wrong. 
Thrasymachus: Since I do not suppose that justice is a moral virtue at all, I do 
not begin to make the mistake that you accuse me here of making. But Socrates, 
your answer puzzles me. Are you saying that moral claims cannot be true or 
false?  Or that moral judgments cannot be correct or mistaken?  If so, it sounds 
like you are agreeing with me, because I deny that there is such a thing as 
genuine moral virtue. 
Socrates: No, Thrasymachus. Moral claims are truth apt, but not because they 
correspond to facts. When we make a moral judgment and then say of our moral 
claim that it is true, we use the truth predicate disquotationally; no spooky 
moral facts are required. Let me illustrate what I mean here. We spoke the other 
day about apartheid, a system of racial segregation and discrimination that I 
learned about in my travels. But we do not accept this practice. If a man from 
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North Africa were to come to Athens, settle here and have a family, he could be a 
full and equal citizen of the polis; the color of his skin would not matter. So 
apartheid must be wrong.   
 When we say, “Apartheid is wrong,” our judgment is made from within a 
morally engaged standpoint. When we say, “It is true that apartheid is wrong,” 
this, too, is made from within a morally engaged standpoint. The sentence 
‘Apartheid is wrong’ is true just in case apartheid is wrong – which of course it 
is.   
Thrasymachus: I am very puzzled by this talk of yours, Socrates. To say that 
the sentence ‘Apartheid is wrong’ is true if and only if apartheid is wrong seems 
to leave us exactly where we were, which is, of course, wondering whether it is 
indeed the case that apartheid is wrong. 
 And this leads me to another question. To whom do you mean to refer by this 
“we” when you talk this way, Socrates?  Do you mean just those of us here in 
Athens?  In Sparta?  Or do you mean everyone everywhere? 
Socrates: I mean anyone who judges from within a normative perspective that 
is admirable. We must reject apartheid, for it is an abominable practice.  
Thrasymachus: But how is this an answer to my question?  Is not what is 
admirable in the eye of the beholder?  The rulers in an apartheid state might find 
that the system of discrimination and segregation that you speak of protects 
their interests. And what is to stop them from adopting such a system?  
Apartheid allows each group to continue its practices and customs separately, 
and so may be said to preserve the stability of the polis.   
 Do you not think that apartheid is “admirable” by the lights of those who 
advocate it?  Isn’t the acceptability of apartheid going to be relative to the 
engaged normative perspective of the speaker? 
Socrates: Of course. Apartheid may be admirable by the lights of those who 
advocate it; this is undeniable. But that doesn’t make the acceptability of 
apartheid relative to the outlook of some individual or group. When I judge that 
apartheid is wrong, I judge from my own perspective. But I judge categorically. I 
do not think that the perspective of the advocate of apartheid is equally justified. 
And so I can rightly and legitimately say: Anyone who thinks apartheid is 
acceptable is mistaken!   
Thrasymachus: So you judge that apartheid is wrong, and you think that 
anyone who judges otherwise is making a mistake. But the rulers of a society 
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may think it necessary to practice apartheid in order to maintain their 
domination and control. Consider the Spartans. In Sparta, the Helots reside in 
their ancestral villages and are not allowed to be members of Spartan society. 
The Spartans subjugate the Helots and harness their labor, which in turn 
supports the Spartan economy. They dominate the Helots in all sorts of other 
ways too, as you know. Spartans may find the practice of apartheid quite natural 
and unobjectionable, for, after all, it closely aligns with what they do to others in 
their own polis. 
That some will think they are being perfectly reasonable in advocating a 
practice you think wrong must be granted from the start. So now tell me clearly: 
What mistake do you think the advocate of apartheid is actually making? What is 
your account of moral error here? 
Socrates: Mine is an account of moral judgment. Instead of giving an account 
of moral error, we should ask what it is that we are doing when we judge that a 
particular claim that connects with ethics is mistaken. And, as I just explained, 
we are expressing a normative perspective. I offer no account of moral error 
except what follows from what I said before about truth. Moral p is mistaken if 
and only if not-p – and that is all that should be said. What it would be for it to 
be a mistake to think that apartheid is always wrong would be for it to be the 
case that apartheid is sometimes just fine.2 
Thrasymachus: But this is just logic, Socrates. You have told me that if p is 
true, then not-p must be false. No doubt this is so. But you have not told me why 
p is true or why not-p is false. When you talk about it “being the case” that some 
moral not-p is so, it certainly sounds like you think there are moral facts. Yet 
earlier, you assured me that there are no moral facts. 
Socrates: Very good Thrasymachus, you are right about both. It does sound 
that way, and there aren't any moral facts. It is perfectly fine to talk as if there 
are moral facts. There is nothing wrong with realist-sounding talk in ordinary 
moral practice. When we talk as if there are moral facts, this is innocent enough. 
But when, from within a morally-engaged standpoint, I judge that such and such 
is a moral fact, I am not detecting any strange thing. I am simply making a 
normative judgment. 
Thrasymachus: Are you?  Well then, tell me more. It sounds to me as if you are 
just saying what you please. Is this judgment a recognition of some mind-
                                                          
2 Blackburn 1998: 318 and 2009: §2.  
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independent fact, or is it constrained by some fact, such that the contrary 
judgment would be mistaken?  If so, tell me what these facts are or how this 
constraint would work.  
Socrates: To say that normative facts are out there, subsisting independently 
of us, might just be a fancy way of putting an aspect of a plan for living. When I 
accept something as a normative fact, for example, that it is wrong to kick dogs 
for fun, I accept a plan to avoid kicking dogs for fun, regardless of what attitude 
toward the practice I have or might come to have, and regardless of whether I am 
surrounded by people who approve of kicking dogs. The claim of independence, 
then, turns out to be internal to normative thinking – though arrayed in 
sumptuous rhetoric.3 
Thrasymachus: To say that this idea of mind independence is woven into the 
project of normative thinking would seem to fly in the face of the very 
conversation we are presently having, Socrates. I do not see how you can simply 
stipulate that this is so when my conception of normative judgment and 
disagreement, the conception with which we began when talking about justice, 
is so dramatically different from the one you are putting forward here. So answer 
me this:  Let us imagine a person who thinks that kicking dogs for fun is always 
fine. He makes a judgment that is structurally the same; it, too, is a normative 
judgment, but with a different content. Will there not then be alternative moral 
facts? 
Socrates: No, no, no, Thrasymachus. You are confused. Moral value is mind-
independent. Even if we had different attitudes, it would still be wrong to kick 
dogs for fun. Similarly, even if we approved of apartheid, apartheid would still be 
wrong. 
Thrasymachus: So you say. But I remain unconvinced. Perhaps you secretly 
believe your moral judgments are constrained by some mind-independent facts 
after all?  I cannot see what else you might have in mind.  
 Socrates: I would never say such a thing; that would violate my commitment 
to naturalism. When I say that moral value is mind-independent, I simply mean 
that genuine moral claims do not alter because of any changing attitudes. Moral 
value does not vary with what attitudes or plans we happen to have; that it does 
not is the nature of how we, conceptually, understand moral value. There are 
                                                          
3 See Gibbard 2003: 186. See Dreier 2012 for discussion.  
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normative facts, within the world of normative judgment, but it is our 
sensibilities that do the foundational explanatory work here and that make such 
facts seem to be. There are no robustly realist normative facts that are “out 
there” independently of us that we search for and then grasp. On the contrary, 
normative facts are “thin” because they do not involve ontological commitment. 
As I said before, moral facts do not belong to some sector of reality. 
 Thrasymachus: I think I understand. You say that your judgment that 
apartheid is wrong is correct because it is a kind of thin normative fact that 
apartheid is wrong. But how do you know that it is a fact that apartheid is 
wrong?  How do you rule out the view of your opponent who makes a contrary 
normative judgment, which also seems to posit thin normative facts, but now 
with opposing content?  
Socrates: “It is a fact that apartheid is wrong” is just a fancy way of saying 
“Apartheid is wrong.” So how do I know that apartheid is wrong?  I judge that 
apartheid is cruel and dehumanizing. Moreover, my judgment would not be 
altered by further acquaintance with facts about apartheid or upon any further 
reflection on its merits or lack thereof. Someone who favors apartheid poses no 
threat to my values. I condemn the practice. A civilized society does not practice 
apartheid. 
Thrasymachus: But Socrates, to say it is “cruel” or “dehumanizing” is very 
close, as far as I can see, to saying, in a slightly different way, simply that it is 
wrong, which is exactly where we began. We have just travelled within a circle of 
related moral terms. Can you say, in non-moral terms, what it is about apartheid 
that makes it cruel, or dehumanizing, and so wrong? What non-moral 
description of the practice justifies this moral one? I cannot see how you can 
legitimately claim to know that any of these moral attributions are genuine 
unless you can answer this question.  
Socrates: To ask for a non-moral description of a practice that justifies our 
moral assessment of it is to ask a misplaced question. The judgment that 
apartheid is cruel and dehumanizing, and hence wrong, is a substantive moral 
judgment that is made from within a normative perspective. As I said before, we 
judge that apartheid is wrong from a morally engaged standpoint, namely a 
perspective within which we have adopted some moral values. 
Thrasymachus: I do not see why I must agree with what you say about moral 
justification. Why is it that to ask for some fact about a practice is to take a 
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perspective external to morality? This seems mere stipulation on your part; 
moral argument does not seem to work that way to me at all. Surely the fact that 
every citizen speaks his mind in a democracy will be rightly pointed to by those 
who wish to defend democracy. And anyway, even if I accept all you say here, I 
still do not have a good answer to my earlier challenge. You have not been able 
to say anything as to why your engaged standpoint is right, and that of your rival 
is wrong. 
Socrates: Of course we appeal to facts when justifying a moral claim. What 
makes it wrong to torture dogs for fun is that torturing dogs causes them pain. 
No one would deny this. But no set of descriptive facts can justify a normative 
perspective itself. So the answer to your challenge can only be given from within 
a moral standpoint. No facts alone can do that work. 
Thrasymachus: But surely you mean, “Torturing dogs causes them unjustified 
pain.” It is the infliction of unjustified pain that makes torture wrong. After all, 
causing pain to those guilty of crimes may be perfectly fine, as I think you would 
agree. But doesn't this show that we need an account of what is a good reason, 
when defending our judgments in moral life?  Don’t we need to say what 
morality aims at, and so which facts will count, and why?  After all, some facts 
count in military strategy, and very different facts count in medicine. Will it not 
be the same way here? I would have thought that was just the sort of argument 
that you would pursue, Socrates. 
 But now I think that you deny that the question of moral justification can be 
answered in a general way. You tell me that it is only when we are within some 
engaged perspective that we can say which facts count, and why. But if that is so, 
then I still cannot see how you can say why you are right and your rival is wrong. 
If a rival says, “But from MY engaged perspective, I don't think the pain of dogs 
should count at all,” other than to deny his position, what can you say? 
 So then it seems that you must agree, for I find in your arguments no counter 
to my view: Justice, or the morally good, is nothing other than what is 
advantageous for the stronger! 
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